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RULE 11 PRACTICE IN FEDERAL AND

STATE COURT: AN EMPIRICAL,
COMPARATIVE STUDY
GERALD F. HESS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most of those who have observed or participated in the Rule 111 debate
disagree about some aspects of the Rule's interpretation, impact, and future. One leading commentator recently characterized the 1983 amendment of Rule 11 as "the most controversial revision in the Federal Rules'
* Associate Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. The author is indebted to
Dr. William Carsrud and Dr. John VanderBeek, both of Gonzaga University, whose assistance
was invaluable in developing the research design, refining the surveys, analyzing the data, and
commenting on this report. The author thanks Professors Stephen B. Burbank, Lawrence M.
Grosberg, Melissa L. Nelken, and Mr. Thomas Willging, whose review of earlier drafts improved
this article. The author also thanks Mike Elliott and Paul Ritzma for their research assistance
and Marge Buck for processing this piece. Finally, the author is indebted to the State Justice
Institute, whose financial support made this research possible.
This study was developed under a grant from the State Justice Institute. Points of view expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or
policies of the State Justice Institute.
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides:
Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided
by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in
equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of
two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The Washington version of the Rule is nearly the same. See WASH. Sup. Cr. C.R. 11. The
only substantive difference is that the Washington rule applies to a "pleading, motion or legal
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half-century history." 2 From 1983 to 1991, more than 150 law journals
published articles about Rule 1 1' At least eight empirical studies of Rule
11 have been reported. 4 Even the popular press discovered the Rule 11
controversy. 5
A.

The Need for This Study

Even though there has been thoughtful empirical research on Rule 11,
leading commentators and the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
recommended additional studies of the Rule's impact and operation.6 This
memorandum" while the federal rule applies to a "pleading, motion or other paper" (emphasis
added).
Throughout this article, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the comparable state provisions will be referred to collectively as "Rule 11."
2. Carl Tobias, Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223, 231 (1991).
3. See volumes 4-12 of CurrentLaw Index under the topics "Civil Procedure" and "Sanctions." See also COMMITTEE ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES 9-16 (1990) [hereinafter CALL FOR

COMMENTS].
4. See generally, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, RULE 11 STUDY, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (1991) (This study surveyed a random sample of lawyers who were lead counsel on cases filed
in federal court in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in 1989-90); STEPHEN B. BURBANK,
RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) (This study included: an analysis of every Rule 11 motion
or sua sponte consideration of Rule 11 decided by the district courts in the Third Circuit between
July 1, 1987, and June 30, 1988; surveys of judges in the Third Circuit; and surveys of attorneys
who practice in the Third Circuit); SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985) (This study surveyed federal district court judges' reactions to 10 hypothetical Rule
11 cases); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
COURTS: SANCTIONS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES (1987) (This study surveyed all federal judicial
officers and over 8,000 attorneys in New York state); ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS & THOMAS
WILLGING, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED SrATES (1991) (This study included surveys of all federal district court judges and an analysis of Rule 11 motions and sua sponte activity in five judicial
districts from 1987 to 1990 (District of Arizona, District of the District of Columbia, Northern

District of Georgia, Eastern District of Michigan, and Western District of Texas)); THOMAS E.
WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988) (This study included interviews of
judges in six federal district courts, interviews with experienced federal practitioners in eight federal district courts, and an analysis of a random sample of published opinions involving Rule 11);

Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of FederalRule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District
of California,74 JUDICATURE 147 (1990) (This study surveyed judges and attorneys in the Northern District of California); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189
(1988) (This study was based on reported decisions).

5. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Lawyers Make Frivolous Arguments at Their Own Risk
WALL ST. J., June 20, 1990, at Al; Stephen Labaton, Courts Rethinking Rule Intended to Slow
Frivolous Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1990, at B18, Col. 3; Ruth Marcus, Rule 11: Does It
Curb Frivolous Lawsuits or Civil Rights Claims?, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1991, at A17.
6. The first recommendation of the Third Circuit Task Force was additional empirical study
of Rule 11. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 96. In a list of empirical research that needs to be done,
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article will examine a study that produces additional data on the topic and
will present data on several subjects that prior empirical research on Rule
11 did not address: (1) impact and operation of Rule 11 in state court; (2)
the changes in the use of the Rule in one federal court over a seven-year
period; and (3) a comparison of the effect of Rule 11 in state and federal
court systems serving the same city. This article provides additional information relevant to policymakers at a critical time.
The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules has proposed amendments
to Federal Rule 111 and that proposal is proceeding through the amendment process. Regardless of the outcome of the federal process, the sixteen

states that have provisions modeled on the pre-1983 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (F.R.C.P.) 118 and the thirty-four states that substantially folMaurice Rosenberg includes: "What is the impact of Rule 11? There are many efforts to gauge
the effect of Rule 11 on civil litigation practices, but no study has yet gotten to the bottom of the
issue." Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-ImpactStudies in the Administration of
Justice, 51 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 13, 30 (1988); see CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 3.
7. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 43-49 (1992) [hereinafter PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS].

8. Before the 1983 amendments, Federal Rule 11 provided:
Signing of Pleadings
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief

there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is
not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as
sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.
For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary

action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1982).
The following states have provisions modeled on the pre-1983 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11:
Alabama (ALA. R. Civ. P. 11); Connecticut (CONN. SUPER. Cr. CIV. R. § 119); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-11); Indiana (IND. ST. TRIAL P. R. 11); Maine (ME. R. Civ. P. 11); Maryland
(MD. ST. GEN. R. 1-311); Massachusetts (MAss. R. Civ. P. 11); Mississippi (MISS. R. Civ. P. 11);
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-824); New Hampshire (N.H. SUPER. Cr. R. 15); New Jersey
(N.J. ST. CT. R. 1:4-8); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. R. 1-011); Ohio (OHIO R. CIV. P. 11);
Pennsylvania (PA. R. Civ. P. 1023); South Carolina (S.C. R. CIv. P. 11); Texas (TEx. STAT. tit. 2,
§§ 9.011, 9.012).
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lowed the post-1983 version of F.R.C.P. 111 should independently assess
the impact and future of Rule 11 in their jurisdictions.
B.

The Purpose, Nature, Methodology, and Organization of This Study

The purpose of this study is to provide and analyze data about the impact of Rule 11 in state and federal courts. It was designed to assess the
costs and benefits of Rule 11 and to help inform the Rule 11 debate.
This article focuses on a comprehensive study of the impact of Rule 11
on one geographic location-emphasizing depth over breadth. Its focus is
the lawyers, judges, and courts in Spokane County, Washington. Spokane
County has a population of approximately 360,000 and is the 101st largest
metropolitan area in the United States." ° The Spokane County Superior
Courts (the state courts of general jurisdiction) and the main office of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington are
located in the City of Spokane.
Three sources provided the data that measured the impact of Rule 11:
(1) surveysII of judges, magistrate judges, and attorneys (hereinafter, judges
and magistrate judges will be referred to collectively as "judges"); (2) case
files in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (hereinafter "federal court" or "Eastern District"); and (3) case files at
the Spokane County Superior Court (hereinafter "state court" or "Superior

Court").
The surveys were designed to provide data on judges and attorneys' experiences with Rule 11, their attitudes toward the rule, and their assessment
9. See supra note 1 for the post-1983 amendment version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. These states
substantially follow the post-1983 version of the Rule: Alaska (ALASKA R. Civ. P. 11); Arizona
(ARIz. R. Civ. P. 11); Arkansas (ARK. ST. R. Civ. P. 11); California (CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§ 447) (applicable to Riverside and San Bernadino Counties only); Colorado (CoLo. R. Civ. P.
11); Delaware (DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 11 and DEL. CH. Cr. R. 11); Hawaii (HAW. R. Civ. P. 11);
Idaho (IDAHO ST. R. Civ. P. 11); Illinois (ILL. Sup. CT. R. 137); Iowa (IOWA STAT. tit. 31
§ 619.19); Kansas (KAN. R. Civ. P. § 60-211); Kentucky (KY. ST. R. Civ. P. 11); Louisiana (LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 863); Michigan (MICH. CT. R. 2.114); Minnesota (MINN. R. Civ. P. 11);
Missouri (Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.03); Montana (MONT. R. Civ. P. 11); Nevada (NEv. ST. R. Civ. P.
11); New York (UNIFORM RULES FOR THE NEW YORK STATE TRIAL COURTS § 130-1.1); North
Carolina (N.C. R. Civ. P. 11); North Dakota (N.D. R. Civ. P. 11); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 2011); Oregon (OR. ST. R. Civ. P. 17); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-29-21); South

Dakota (S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 15-6-11(a)(b)); Tennessee

(TENN.

R. Civ. P. 11); Utah

ST. R. Civ. P. 11); Vermont (VT. ST. R. Civ. P. 11); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01271.1); Washington (WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11); West Virginia (W. VA. ST. R. Civ. P. 11);
Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. § 802.05); Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 1-14-128).
(UTAH

10. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
UNITED STATES 31 (1991).

U.S.

DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

11. See infra Appendix A for the Judge/Magistrate Survey and Appendix B for the Attorney
Survey.
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of its impact. In 1990, surveys were mailed to all six judges at the federal
district court, all ten judges at the Superior court, and all 1,095 attorneys
with offices or residences in Spokane County. The survey was mailed a
second time to those who did not initially respond. Six federal judges
(100%), nine of the ten state judges (90%), and 506 of the 1,095 attorneys
(46%) answered the survey.1 2
Data were gathered from civil cases filed in the federal court from August 1, 1983 (the effective date of the 1983 amendments to federal Rule 11),
through December 31, 1990. The docket sheet for each civil case was reviewed manually or electronically to identify cases with documents containing "Sanctions," "Fees," "Attorney's Fees," "Terms," or "1 1." The file for
each identified case was reviewed and information was gathered from each
case that involved a Rule 11 order or a Rule 11 request in a motion or brief.
In the state court, data were gathered from civil cases13 filed after September 1, 1985, the effective date of the 1985 amendments to the state version of Rule 11. It was impossible to use docket sheets to identify potential
Rule 11 cases in state court because of the abbreviated manner in which
docket entries were made. Consequently, the file of every civil case in
which any type of motion was made in 1990 was reviewed to identify the
civil cases that involved a Rule 11 request, motion, or order. Because the
process of identifying Rule 11 cases in state court was more time consuming
than those in federal court, data were gathered only from those cases that
initiated the Rule 11 activity between January 1, 1990, and December 31,
1990.
The remainder of this article is divided into three main sections: Part
II, Data Presentation; Part III, Comparison With Other Empirical Studies;
and Part IV, Implications of the Data. Part II presents data on three topics
for both state and federal court. First, the amount and nature of Rule 11
activity is described. Second, figures are presented on the following potential benefits or goals of the Rule: increased pre-filing fact and law inquiry
by attorneys; reduced litigation delay; reduced litigation costs; reduced abusive litigation tactics; reduced frivolous suits, claims, or defenses; and increased suit settlements. Third, figures are presented on the following
potential costs or criticisms of the Rule: the satellite litigation problem (the
cost of Rule 11 motions to the court and parties); the aggravation of rela12. Attorney survey data reported in this article is based on the responses of attorneys whose

practice included some civil litigation: 385 respondents met this criteria.
13. The Office of the Spokane County Clerk of Superior Court distinguishes civil cases (tort,
property, commercial, administrative review) from domestic relations and paternity cases. The
term "civil cases" in this study follows that distinction. Thus, Rule 11 activity in domestic relations and paternity cases is not part of this study.
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tionships between opposing attorneys, between attorneys and clients, and
between attorneys and judges; the chilling effect on novel theories and
growth in the law; the disproportionate impact of the Rule on plaintiffs,
civil rights plaintiffs, and solo practitioners; and the overuse of monetary,
fee-shifting sanctions. In Part III, data from the federal court portion of
this study are compared to data from other empirical studies of Rule 11.
Part IV discusses the implications of the data for policymakers who will
decide the fate of the proposed amendment to Federal Rule 11 and the
future of state versions of the Rule.
II.

DATA PRESENTATION

A.

Rule 11 Activity

This section presents a broad overview of the level and nature of Rule
11 activity in federal and state court. It includes case-fie data regarding the
incidence and disposition of Rule 11 activity in court and survey data concerning the formal and informal use of Rule 11 by judges and lawyers.
1. Federal Court Rule 11 Activity
From August 1, 1983, through December 31, 1990, 6,841 civil cases
were filed in the Eastern District. 14 The files of those cases contained 110
formal Rule 11 requests in eighty-nine cases. The term "formal Rule 11
requests" includes written requests in briefs or motions by parties for Rule
11 sanctions and instances where the court raised a Rule 11 sanction issue.
Nearly all of the formal requests (96%) were initiated by the parties; the
court formally raised Rule 11 only four times.

14. See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS A14-A15 (1984) (1,063 cases); STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIv., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS A18-A19 (1985) (1,146 cases); STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIV.,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 34-35 (1986)
(1,096 cases); STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 32-33 (1987) (868 cases); STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 34-35 (1988) (694 cases); STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIV.,
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 26-27 (1989)

(857 cases); STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 34-35 (1990) (708 cases). The author reviewed the

docket books for civil cases for the year 1983 and found that from August 1 through December
31, 1983, 356 civil cases were filed. Hereinafter, these reports will be referred to as JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS.
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Commentators predicted that the amount of Rule 11 activity would plateau and taper off after a "shake out" period of five years or so."s Arthur
Miller wrote in 1990 that "there are signs that the practice under the rule
has begun to stabilize and the overly enthusiastic hyperactivity of the first
few years following its promulgation has begun to subside." 16 Such is not
the case in the Eastern District. The number of Rule 11 requests did follow
the predicted pattern from 1984 through 1988: it rose, plateaued, and
tapered off. However, the formal Rule 11 activity initiated in 1989 and
1990 increased dramatically. (See Chart 1).
CHART 1
FORMAL RULE

11

REQUESTS BY YEAR

FEDERAL COURT

NUMBER OF FORMAL RULE

5

11 REQUESTS

4

1984

1985

1986 1987
1988
Year Request Made

1989

1990

Chart 2 lists the documents that the formal Rule 11 requests targeted.
Complaints and motions are by far the most common targets, while answers
and discovery papers are rarely targets. Note that sanction motions are the
most common type of target motion.

15. WILLGING, THE RULE I1 SANCTIONING PROCESS, supra note 4, at 39-40 & n.65; see
Nancy H. Wilder, Note, The 1983 Amendments to Rule 11: Answering the Critics' Concern With
JudicialSelf-Restraint, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 798, 817-18 (1986).
16. Arthur R. Miller, The New CertificationStandard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 506
(1990).
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CHART 2
TARGET OF FORMAL RULE 11 REQUESTS
FEDERAL COURT

Number1
55
5
5
2
1
1

Complaint
Answer
Discovery
Affidavit
Cost Bill
Attorney Lien
'.3
Motion
For Sanctions
Dismiss
Summary Judgment
Amend Judgment
Reconsideration
Attorneys' Fees
Removal
Disqualify Counsel
Amend Pleadings
Extend Time
Compel Discovery
Default
Relief from Judgment
Certification of Finality
Joinder
Suppress Deposition
Recusal of Judge

7

Percentage(%)
49
4
4
2
1
1
38

s

Chart 3 summarizes the disposition of the formal Rule 11 requests. The
court imposed sanctions in nineteen instances, seventeen percent of the
Rule 11 requests. Sanctions were denied in seventy-two instances. In
eleven instances the court never decided the Rule 11 request because the
parties settled the case. In one case, the movant withdrew the Rule 11 motion. Finally, in seven cases the files reveal no disposition of the Rule 11
requests even though the cases were terminated or the underlying issues
were resolved. It is not known whether the parties orally withdrew the
requests, the court orally denied them, or the court did not decide them.
None of the Rule 11 requests were pending.
17. Although the total number of formal Rule 11 requests was 110, there were 112 paper
targets. Two of the Rule 11 requests had multiple targets.
18. Due to rounding of percentages, the total percentage in each chart may be slightly more
or less than 100.
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CHART 3
DISPOSITION OF FORMAL RULE

11 REQUESTS

FEDERAL COURT

Disposition
Sanctions Imposed
Sanctions Denied
Case Settled
Request Withdrawn
No Disposition

Percentage (%)
17
65
10
1
6

Number
19
72
11
1
7

110
The number and rate of instances where the court imposed sanctions
took a quantum leap in 1990. Chart 4 details the number of formal Rule 11
requests and the number of requests for which sanctions were imposed in
years 1984 through 1990. From 1984 through 1989, sanctions were imposed in ten of the seventy-nine Rule 11 requests (13%). In 1990, sanctions
were imposed in nine of the thirty-one requests (29%).
CHART 4
FORMAL RULE

11

REQUESTS GRANTED BY YEAR

FEDERAL COURT

Formal Rule 11 Requests
Requests for Which
Sanctions Were Imposed

1984
4
0

1985
16
1

1986
14

1987
11

1988
12

1989
22

1990
31

2

4

1

2

9

The survey data provide additional information about the Rule 11 activity in the Eastern District. The federal judge data throughout this report
came from the survey responses of the six judges who preside in the Eastern
District. The federal attorney figures were based on the survey responses of
forty-one attorneys who reported that at least 75% of their civil litigation
practice took place in federal court. The survey asked both judges and attorneys about their formal and informal Rule 11 activity since August 1,
1983, the effective date of the 1983 amendments to Federal Rule 11.
Most of the judges had been involved in both formal and informal Rule
11 activity. Eighty-three percent of the judges reported that they had decided Rule 11 motions raised by attorneys or parties. Eighty-three percent
also said that they had warned attorneys (without formally raising Rule 11
on the judge's own motion) that they were in violation or approaching vio-
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lation of Rule 11. The judges believed that the warnings were effective in
fifty-nine of the sixty-four instances (92%) in which they were used.
The survey questioned attorneys about their formal (when one party or
attorney asks the court to impose Rule 11 sanctions on another party or
attorney) and informal (when one party or attorney warns another party or
attorney that he or she is in violation or approaching violation of the Rule)
involvement with Rule 11. A substantial percentage of attorneys reported
formal or informal activity. Chart 5 summarizes the results.
CHART 5
ATTORNEY SURVEY

FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULE 11 ACTIVITY
FEDERAL COURT

Activity
Percentage (%)
Formal-Sought Rule 11 sanctions at least once
34
Formal--Opponent sought Rule 11 sanctions at least once
40
Informal-Warned opponent at least once
51
Informal-Warned by opponent at least once
38
2.

State Court Rule 11 Activity

During 1990, forty-eight formal Rule 11 requests in forty-five cases were
made in civil cases in the Spokane County Superior Court. Parties raised
all of the forty-eight requests in written briefs or motions. None of the
judges raised formal Rule 11 requests during 1990.
Chart 6 sets out the target of the Rule 11 requests. Complaints are by
far the most common targets, with motions, discovery, and answers comprising the bulk of the remaining targets.
CHART 6
TARGET OF FORMAL RULE

11 REQUESTS

STATE COURT

Target .
Complaint
Answer
Discovery
Summons
Motion

Number
27
4
6
1
10

Percentage (%)
56
8
12
2
21
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CHART 6 (continued)
For Sanctions
2
Dismissal
2
Summary Judgment
1
1
Relief from Judgment
Vacate Arbitration Award 1
Compel Settlement
1
Compel Arbitration
1
Suppress Deposition
1
Chart 7 summarizes the disposition of Rule 11 activity. The court
granted Rule 11 requests four times, a mere eight percent of the requests.
Sanctions were denied in twenty-five instances. In five cases the parties settled before the court decided the Rule 11 request and in one instance the
movant withdrew the request. Finally, in thirteen cases the files reveal no
disposition of the Rule 11 request even though the cases were terminated or
the underlying issues were resolved. None of the Rule 11 requests were
pending.
CHART 7
DIsPosrrION OF FORMAL RULE 11 REQUESTS
STATE COURT
Disposition

Number

Percentage (%)

Sanctions Imposed
Sanctions Denied
Case Settled
Request Withdrawn
No Disposition

4
25
5
1
13
48

8
52
10
2
27

The survey data provide additional information about the amount of
Rule 11 activity in state court. The judge survey data came from the responses of nine of the ten Spokane County Superior Court judges. The state
attorney data are based on the survey responses of 247 attorneys who reported that at least seventy-five percent of their civil litigation practice was
in Washington Superior Courts. The survey asked both judges and attorneys about their formal and informal Rule 11 activity since September 1,
1985, the effective date of the 1985 amendments to state Rule 11.
Most of the judges (89%) had decided Rule 11 motions raised by the
parties. More than half of the judges (56%) had warned attorneys or parties (without formally raising Rule 11 on the judge's own motion) that they
were in violation or approaching violation of Rule 11. The judges who is-
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sued warnings believed that they were effective in nineteen of the twentyfour instances (79%).
A substantial percentage of the attorneys report formal or informal involvement with Rule 11. Chart 8 summarizes the results.
CHART 8
ATTORNEY SURVEY
FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULE 11 ACTIVITY
STATE COURT

Activity
Percentage (%)
Formal-Sought Rule 11 sanctions at least once
34
Formal-Opponent sought Rule 11 sanctions at least once
31
Informal-Warned opponent at least once
46
Informal-Warned by opponent at least once
29

3.

Comparison of State and Federal Court Rule 11 Activity

An examination of the survey data generally shows that the percentage
of attorneys and judges reporting experience with Rule 11 activity is similar
in state and federal court. The attorney survey results establish that an
identical percentage of federal court and state court attorneys report that
they sought formal Rule 11 sanctions. A slightly higher percentage of federal court attorneys than state court attorneys report experience with the
informal use of Rule 11. Chart 9 compares the percentage of responses of
federal court and state court attorneys.
CHART 9
ATTORNEY SURVEY
RULE 11 ACTIVITY
FEDERAL/STATE COMPARISON

Activity
Federal (%)
Formal-Sought Rule 11 sanctions
34
Formal-Opponent sought Rule 11 sanctions
40
Informal-Warned opponent
51
Informal-Warned by opponent
38

State (%)
34
31
46
29

The judge survey data show that most federal and state judges decided
Rule 11 motions raised by parties. However, a higher percentage of federal
judges than state judges had warned attorneys or parties that they were in
violation or approaching violation of Rule 11. Chart 10 shows a comparison of the percentage of responses of federal and state judges.
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CHART 10
JUDGE SURVEY

RULE 11 ACTIVITY
FEDERAL/STATE COMPARISON

Activity
Decided Rule 11 Motion by Parties
Warned Attorney or Party

Federal (%)
83
83

State (%)
89
56

The survey gathered case file data on formal Rule 11 activity in 1990 in
state court and from 1984 through 1990 in federal court. The comparisons
that follow are based on formal activity in state and federal court in 1990
only.
Rule 11 activity in state and federal court was quite similar in two ways.
First, the parties, rather than the judge, initiated nearly all formal Rule 11
activity. In federal court, Rule 11 was initiated thirty times by the parties
and once by the judge. In state court, all forty-eight Rule 11 requests were
made by the parties. Second, the target of Rule 11 request was the complaint approximately one-half of the time in either court. Chart 11 shows a
comparison of the target of formal Rule 11 activity in federal and state
court.
CHART 11
TARGET OF FORMAL RULE 11 ACTIVITY
FEDERAL/STATE COMPARISON

Target
Complaint
Motion
Answer
Discovery
Other

Federal
Number (%)
15
(48)
13
(42)
0
(0)
2
(6)
1
(3)
T1

State
Number (%)
27
(56)
10
(21)
4
(8)
6
(12)
1
(2)
48

In two important respects, formal Rule 11 activity was much different
in state and federal court. First, the likelihood that a case involved Rule 11
activity was higher in federal court than in state court. In federal court
during 1990, 708 civil cases were filed, 1,013 were terminated, 9 and 28 had
formal Rule 11 activity. In state court during 1990, 4,193 civil cases were
19. JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS (1990), supra note 14, at 27.
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filed, 3,155 were terminated,2" and 45 cases had formal Rule 11 activity.
Thus, nearly six times as many civil cases were filed in state court than in
federal court and more than three times as many civil cases were terminated
in state court than in federal court. However, lawyers in state court made
less than twice as many Rule 11 requests as lawyers in federal court.
The second major difference between state and federal court in formal
Rule 11 activity was the disposition of Rule 11 requests. Sanctions were
imposed at more than three times the rate in federal court (29% of requests) than in state court (8% of requests).
A number of attorneys who responded to the survey commented on the
infrequent imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in state court. For example, one
lawyer stated, "I find that Rule 11 is not applied by our state court judges
and no sanctions are imposed for the most blatant violations." 2 Another
commented, "[T]rial court judges in Spokane County are generally disin22
clined to grant sanctions, including Rule 11 sanctions."
It could be inferred from these comments and the data that one reason
why fewer state cases involved Rule 11 than federal cases was that state
court attorneys believed that Rule 11 motions would almost certainly be
denied in state court. One attorney explained, "I do not seek them because
I do not expect them to be granted, except in egregious circumstances
23

....

In most cases, a motion for sanctions would just waste time and

money."
One factor that may explain why state judges imposed Rule 11 sanctions
less often than federal judges is that pre-trial motions are handled differently in state and federal court. In the Eastern District, a case is assigned to
a judge when it is filed and that judge hears all subsequent motions. Most
cases in Spokane County Superior Court are not assigned to a judge until
they approach trial. Pre-trial motions are heard by the judges on a rotating
basis. Consequently, the state judge hearing a Rule 11 request usually has
not had any prior contact with the case. A judge with firsthand knowledge
of the previous proceedings in a case may be more likely to award sanctions
when reviewing questionable papers than a judge who is reviewing the file
for the first time.
A number of lawyers suggested a different explanation:
20.
INGTON

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COURTS, REPORT OF THE COURTS OF WASH-

10-16 (1990).

21. This comment was in response to the author's survey. The actual survey is contained in
Appendixes A and B (original on file with author).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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In state court, however, we see widespread violations of CR-11 ....
Yet we know that the court would never do anything about it, even
if we ask. The judges are really nice people who want to make
everyone happy; they are also elected at the state level. As such, it is
difficult for them to come down hard on either attorneys or clients
even though CR-1I is violated, the
theory being "everyone should be
24
able to have their day in court."
B.

Rule 11 Goals and Benefits

One of the goals of the drafters of Rule 11 was to have attorneys conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis for their claim,
defense, motion, or argument before filing the relevant paper in court. 25
The proponents of the Rule hoped that the pre-filing inquiry requirement
and mandatory sanctions for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry would
lead to a number of benefits: fewer frivolous claims, defenses, and motions;2 6 fewer abusive litigation practices, such as fling papers for harassment or delay;27 reduced litigation cost and delay;2 8 and an increase in suit
settlement.2 9
The surveys questioned attorneys and judges about their opinions of the
effect of Rule 11 on each of the attorney behaviors listed above as goals or
benefits of the Rule. Regarding the extent of attorneys' pre-filing fact and
law inquiries, judges were asked about the impact of Rule 11 on attorneys
practicing before them; attorneys were asked about the impact of the Rule
on their own pre-filing inquiries. The results are summarized in Chart 12.
Substantial percentages of judges and attorneys said that Rule 11 caused an
24. Id.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments [hereinafter, Advisory Committee Note] provide in part: "The new language stresses the need for some prefiling
inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule." See
Melissa L. Nelken, Has the ChancellorShot Himself in the Foot? Looking For a Middle Ground
on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 385 (1990); William W. Schwartzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1988).
26. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 25; A. Leo Levin & Sylvan A. Sobel, Achieving
Balance in the Developing Law ofSanctions, 36 CATH.U. L. REV. 587, 590-91 (1987); Schwarzer,
supra note 25, at 1014-15.
27. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 25; Levin & Sobel, supra note 26 at 590-91;
Schwarzer, supra note 25, at 1013; Neal H. Klausner, Note, The Dynamics ofRule 11: Preventing
FrivolousLitigation by DemandingProfessionalResponsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 315 (1986).
28. Advisory Committee Note, supra note 25 (the Committee believed greater use of sanctions by judges would "help to streamline litigation"); Levin & Sobel, supra note 26 at 590; Kim
M. Rubin, Note, Hasa Kafkaesque Dream Come True? FederalRule of Civil Procedure11: Time
ForAnother Amendment?, 67 B.U. L. REv. 1019, 1021 (1987).
29. See WILLGING, supra note 4, at 5, 115-20 (attorneys and judges report that Rule 11 tends
to facilitate rather than hinder the settlement process).
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increase in the extent of pre-filing fact and law inquiries. The impact of
Rule 11 on attorneys who practice primarily in state court was substantial,
with forty-nine percent reporting increased fact inquiry and forty-five percent reporting increased law inquiry. However, the greatest effect of the
Rule as to pre-filing inquiry was on attorneys who practice primarily in
federal court, with seventy-one percent reporting increased fact inquiry and
sixty-three percent reporting increased law inquiry.
CHART 12
RULE 11

IMPACT ON EXTENT OF

Impact
Extent of Pre-Filing Fact Inquiry
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Extent of Pre-Filing Legal Inquiry
Increased
No Effect
Decreased

PRE-FILING INQUIRY

Judges (%)
Federal State

Attorneys (%)
Federal State

50
33
17

67
33
0

71
29
0

49
49
1

67
17
17

44
56
0

63
37
0

45
53
1

Increasing the extent of attorneys' pre-filing fact and law inquiry is not
an end in itself. That increase is desirable only if it leads to the other purported benefits of Rule 11.30 Judges and lawyers were asked to assess the
impact of Rule 11 on the number of frivolous suits, defenses, or motions. A
majority of the judges and a substantial minority of the attorneys believed
Rule 11 has decreased the number of frivolous claims, defenses, or motions.
The results are presented in Chart 13.
30. Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of

Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1960 (1989). "[I]t is essential not to equate evidence of effects
on practice as benefits ....

Indeed, even an effect as apparently benign as enhanced pre-filing

legal inquiry may be misleading. At some point, such inquiry may not be justified, particularly in
light of the rate at which cases are settled." Id.; see also Mark S. Stein, Of Impure Hearts and
Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of Rule 11 Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 393, 411 (1991).

"[T]he important issue is not whether Rule 11 has increased pre-filing inquiry, but whether it has
lessened the filing of frivolous papers." Id.
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CHART 13
EFFECT OF RULE 11 ON THE NUMBER OF
FRIVOLOUS SUITS, DEFENSES, OR MOTIONS

Impact
Increased
No Effect
Decreased

Judges (%)
Federal
State
0
0
50
22
78
50

Attorneys (%)
State
Federal
0
2
62
49
49
38

The judges and attorneys were also asked to assess the effect of Rule 11
on the cost, time, and settlement of civil litigation. Chart 14 lists the results. The vast majority of judges and lawyers generally believed that Rule
11 had no effect on these aspects of litigation. The one exception is that
fifty percent of the federal judges believed that the Rule decreased the
amount of time for the resolution of suits. On the other hand, most attorneys who believed Rule 11 had an impact on suit cost and time thought that
the impact was negative; they believed Rule 11 increased suit cost and time.
It is safe to say that Rule 11 generally did not have beneficial impacts on
cost, time, and settlement of civil litigation.
CHART 14
EFFECT OF RULE

11

ON THE COST, TIME, AND

SETTLEMENT OF LITIGATION

Impact

Judges (%)
Federal State

Attorneys (%)
Federal State

Cost of Litigation
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Time for Resolution of Suit
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Likelihood of Settlement of Suit
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
The survey asked the judges and attorneys about the impact of Rule 11
on abusive litigation practices, in particular, the filing of papers for delay or
harassment. It asked judges about the impact on attorneys who practiced
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before them. Attorneys were asked about the impact on their own practices
and those of opposing attorneys. Chart 15 summarizes the results.
Two observations about this data are relevant. First, a slightly higher
percentage of federal judges and lawyers believed Rule 11 reduced abusive
litigation practices than did their state court counterparts. Second, judges
were much more confident than attorneys that Rule 11 had a beneficial
impact on litigation abuse. The vast majority of judges believed Rule 11
reduced the filing of papers for delay and harassment while most lawyers
felt Rule 11 had no effect on those practices.
CHART 15
EFFECT OF RULE 11 ON ABUSIVE LITIGATION PRACTICES

Impact

Federal (%)

State (%)

Likelihood of Filing Papersfor Delay
Judges re attorneys before them
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Attorneys re own practices
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Attorneys re opponents' practices
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Likelihood of Filing Papersfor Harassment
Judges re attorneys before them
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Attorneys re own practices
Increased
No Effect
Decreased
Attorneys re opponents' practices
Increased
No Effect
Decreased

C. Rule 11 Problems and Costs
Critics of Rule 11 have raised a host of concerns about the negative
impacts of the Rule. This study gathered data relevant to five types of po-
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tential Rule 11 problems and costs: (1) satellite litigation; (2) tension
among judges, attorneys, and clients; (3) chilling effects; (4) disproportionate impacts on certain parties and attorneys; and (5) overuse of monetary,
fee-shifting sanctions.
1. Satellite Litigation
One of the most persistent criticisms of Rule 11 is that it has spawned
satellite litigation necessary to decide sanction requests.31 The satellite
litigation problem has several aspects. Some Rule 11 commentators assert
that Rule 11 motions have become routine; parties spend resources prosecuting or defending the motions, and courts spend time deciding them.3 2
One critic pointed out that most of the resources expended on Rule 11 motions are wasted because the vast majority of the motions are denied. 33 Finally, Rule 11 motions can be used to harass an opponent rather than to
respond to papers that fail to satisfy the rule.34
The incidence data for 1990 show that Rule 11 requests are not routine
in the federal or state court; Rule 11 requests were raised in twenty-eight of
the civil cases pending in federal court and in forty-five of the civil cases
pending in Superior court. However, Rule 11 activity did occur in a higher
proportion of federal than state cases. 35
This study did not attempt to measure the time and money expended by
parties and courts on Rule 11 matters. However, satellite litigation costs
can be assessed indirectly by looking at the briefs and affidavits parties file
regarding Rule 11 requests and the hearings judges hold to decide those
matters. From 1984 through 1990, 110 requests for Rule 11 sanctions were
raised in federal court; during 1990, forty-eight such requests were made in
31. E.g., Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance:
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REv. 575, 587 (1987); Nelken, supra note 25, at 384, 386-87;
Vairo, supra note 4, at 195, 232-33.
32. Roger M. Barton, Stepping on Board the Rule 11 Bandwagon, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249,
259 (1987); Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HolsrRA L. REv. 499, 534-35 (1986); Vairo, supra note 4, at 195.
The Advisory Committee was concerned about the potential costs of satellite litigation:
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective operation of the pleading
regimen will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions,
the court must to the extent possible limit the scope of sanction proceedings to the record.
Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.
Advisory Committee Note, supra note 25.
33. Stein, supra note 30, at 417.
34. Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 533.
35. See supra section II.A.3.
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state court. The briefs, affidavits, and hearings relevant to those Rule 11
requests are summarized in Charts 16, 17, and 18.
CHART 16
BRIEFS RE RULE 11 REQUESTS
Brief Filed

Federal (N= 110)
State (N=48)

Yes(%) No(%)
99(90) 11(10)
45(94) 3 (6)

Movant's Briefs
Average
Number Pages
122
4.1
49
2.6

CHART 17
11

AFFIDAVITS RE RULE

Affidavits Filed

36

REQUESTS

Movant's Affidavits

Respondent's Briefs
Average
Number
Pages
50
4.2
13
3.9

37

Respondent's Affidavits

Exhibit

Exhibit

Average Average
Average Average
Yes(%) No(%) Number Pages
Pages Number Pages
Pages
Federal *47(43) 63(57)
59
3.4
6.9
28
5.4
13.1
State
**19(40) 29(60)
25
2.8
.9
6
3.0
0
* (N=110)
** (N=48)

CHART 18
HEARINGS RE RULE 11 REQUESTS

Hearing
Yes(%)
Federal *54(49)
State
**27(56)

Held
No(%)
56(51)
21(44)

Nature of Hearing
Oral Arg. Evidentiary
52
2
27
0

Combined with
Other Motion
Yes(%)
No(%)
42(78)
12(22)
24(89)
3(11)

* (N=110)
** (N=48)

36. The figures in Chart 16 include briefs that address Rule 11 only and briefs that address
Rule 11 and other matters. "Movant" means the party requesting Rule 11 sanctions and
"Respondent" means the party against whom sanctions are sought. In federal court, 39% of the
Movants' briefs and 46% of the Respondents' briefs addressed Rule 11 alone. In state court, 11%
of the Movants' briefs and 23% of the Respondents' briefs addressed Rule 11 alone. The
"Average Pages" figures are the average number of pages addressed to Rule 11 per brief.
37. In Chart 17, "Average Pages" means the average number of pages in the affidavits and
"Exhibit Average Pages" means the average number of pages of exhibits attached to the affidavit.
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Once a Rule 11 request was made, it was very likely that a brief addressing that request would be filed in either federal (90%) or state (94%) court.
In both courts, the party requesting sanctions would probably file a brief, all
or part of which would address Rule 11. The portion of the movant's brief
addressed to Rule 11 averaged approximately four pages in federal court
and two and one-half pages in state court. In either court, it was less likely
that the respondent would file a brief. The portion of respondents' briefs
addressed to Rule 11 averaged approximately four pages in either court. In
either federal or state court, about forty percent of the Rule 11 requests
generated affidavits. The federal court affidavits tended to be longer than
those in state court. In federal court, movants' affidavits averaged approximately three and one-half pages with seven pages of exhibits, while respondents' affidavits averaged approximately five and one-half pages with
thirteen pages of exhibits. In state court, both movants and respondents'
affidavits averaged about three pages and usually had no exhibits.
State and federal judges had very similar experiences regarding hearings
held on Rule 11 requests. In either court, a hearing was held on approximately one-half of the Rule 11 requests, the hearing was almost always limited to oral argument (rather than evidentiary), and the Rule 11 hearing
was usually combined with a hearing on another motion.
To get a better idea of the extent of the burden Rule 11 requests place
on judges, it may be helpful to analyze the "typical" experience of a judge in
state and federal court in 1990.38 In federal court, each judge handled nine
Rule 11 requests, which generated fifteen briefs (four pages each), seven
affidavits (each was four pages long and had nine pages of exhibits), and five
hearings (all were limited to oral argument and four were combined with a
hearing on other motions). In state court, each judge handled five Rule 11
requests, which generated six briefs (three pages each), three affidavits (each
was three pages long and had a one-page exhibit), and three hearings (all
were limited to oral argument and were combined with hearings on other
motions). Thus, the satellite litigation burden on federal court judges was
approximately twice as great as the burden on state court judges.
Most of the time and effort of judges and attorneys related to formal
Rule 11 activity were expended on unsuccessful Rule 11 requests. In federal court from 1984-1990, only seventeen percent of the Rule 11 requests

38. The "typical"
Charts 16, 17, and 18;
superior court judges;
(rather than the judge

experience analysis is based on three factors: (1) the data presented in
(2) during 1990, there were three federal district court judges and ten state
and (3) during 1990, 28 Rule 11 requests were addressed to the judges
magistrates) in federal court.
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were granted. In state court, a mere eight percent of the requests were
granted.
The survey data provide some insight into the problem of abusive Rule
11 motions. Attorneys and judges were asked whether they agreed with
this statement: "Attorneys use Rule 11 as a tactic to harass and intimidate
opponents." Chart 19 summarizes the results. Rule 11 was used for improper purposes in both state and federal court, although the problem was
greater in federal court.
CHART 19
"ATTORNEYS USE RULE 11 AS A TACTIC TO HARASS AND
INTIMIDATE OPPONENTS."

Response
Agree
No Opinion
Disagree
2.

Judge (%)
Federal
State
67
56
0
44
33
0

Attorney (%)
Federal
State
63
49
13
21
24
30

Straining Relationships

Commentators have predicted that Rule 11 would strain relationships
between opposing attorneys, attorneys and judges, and attorneys and their
clients. 39 The survey questioned judges and attorneys about the impact of
Rule 11 on these relationships. Charts 20, 21, and 22 summarize the survey
results.
CHART 20
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTORNEYS FOR OPPOSING PARTIES

Effect

Judges (%)
Federal
State

Attorneys (%)
Federal
State

Aggravated
No Effect

50
33

45
33

63
34

44
51

Improved

17

22

3

5

39. Cavanagh, supra note 32, at 501; Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity
and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 365-66 (1989); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended
FederalRule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1343-45 (1986).
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CHART 21
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES

Effect
Aggravated
No Effect
Improved

Judges (%)
Federal
State
40
11
40
56
20
33

Attorneys (%)
Federal
State
40
26
49
69
11
5

CHART 22
RELATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS

Effect
Aggravated
No Effect
Improved

Judges (%)
Federal
State
0
0
100
100
0
0

Attorneys
Federal
35
54
11

(%)
State
23
70
7

Approximately one-half of judges and attorneys in both federal and
state court believed Rule 11 aggravated relations between opposing attorneys. Nearly two-thirds of the lawyers who practice primarily in federal
court reported this negative impact. On the other hand, about twenty percent of the judges felt Rule 11 improved relations between attorneys. Few
attorneys believed Rule 11 improved attorney-attorney relations.
Forty percent of the federal judges and attorneys believed Rule 11 aggravated bench-bar relations. Much smaller percentages of state attorneys
and judges felt a negative effect. In fact, one-third of the state judges believed Rule 11 improved the judge-attorney relationship. However, few attorneys felt this improvement.
All of the judges believed that Rule 11 did not affect attorney-client
relationships. Approximately one-third of the federal attorneys and onefourth of the state attorneys reported that Rule 11 aggravated attorneyclient relationships.
Charts 20, 21, and 22 provide support for generalizations about the effect of Rule 11 on relationships between attorneys, judges, and clients.
First, many attorneys believed Rule 11 aggravated all three types of relationships. Second, more judges than attorneys believed Rule 11 improved
attorney-attorney and attorney-judge relationships. Finally, Rule 11's negative impact on these relationships was felt more strongly in federal court
than state court.
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Numerous attorneys commented on the negative impact of Rule 11 on
their relationships with other attorneys, judges, and clients. Three such responses are as follows:
The rule, or more specifically, increased use and enforcement of
the rule, has been a major contributing factor toward more contentious relations among lawyers. It has also strained bench-bar relations. No one in this firm is allowed to use it or threaten its use.
This also affects the relationship between attorneys. If I run into
an attorney that likes to cite Rule 11 at every turn, I tend to want
everything to be done by the book. That means no accommodation,
everything in writing, only the essentials of professional courtesy
and the like. The trial practice is stressful enough without this type
of nonsense.
The hardest thing is explaining to clients that you need independent proof of their claims or positions. Clients are-and perhaps should be-accustomed to having their attorneys believe
them. 4°
3.

Chilling Effects

Many commentators have expressed concern that Rule 11 would chill
legitimate advocacy.4 ' More specifically, critics feared that Rule 11 would
reduce the number of creative claims, defenses, and arguments which in
turn would limit access to courts for parties with unconventional claims or
defenses and would retard growth in the law. 2 Chart 23 presents survey
data regarding the chilling effects of Rule 11.
These figures suggest that the great majority of attorneys in both state
and federal court did not feel the Rule 11 chill. Most attorneys reported
that Rule 11 did not affect their creative advocacy or their willingness to
take cases or assert claims or defenses. On the other hand, Rule 11 caused
some attorneys to refuse to make arguments to change the law, to take meritorious cases, or to assert meritorious claims. It may be that those arguments, cases, or claims were the ones that would have changed the law.
Thus, the figures in Chart 23 may represent a serious chilling effect of Rule
11.
40. These comments were in response to the author's survey. The actual survey is contained
in Appendixes A and B (original on file with author).
41. Elson & Rothschild, supra note 39, at 365; Nelken, supra note 39, at 1338-43; Vairo,
supra note 4, at 200-01.

42. Grosberg, supra note 31, at 633-38; Nelken, supra note 25, at 386; Mark S. Stein, Rule 11
in the Real World, 132 F.R.D. 309 (1991); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standardsfor
Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REv. 630, 632 (1987).
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CHART 23
RULE 11 CHILLING EFFECTS

Effect
Decreased willingness to make arguments to extend or
change law
Did not accept meritorious case because of concern about
Rule 11 sanctions
Did not assert meritorious claims or defenses due to
concern about Rule 11 sanctions

Federal
Attorney
M%

State
Attorney
W

11

20

15

10

23

14

A number of attorneys commented on the chilling effect of Rule 11 on
creative advocacy. One attorney stated:
I believe Rule 11 chills the creativeness of lawyers to a very substantial degree. Over the past 30 years, our law has expanded on behalf
of our environment and civil rights. This expansion has improved
the likelihood of our society becoming more productive and safer.
The benefit has, time and again, been delivered on the weary shoulders of ideas which, at the time of their initial advancement, were
considered extreme, if not totally blasphemous. In keeping with a
judiciary which is more enamored with efficiency than sharp, fair
analysis[,] ... Rule 11 will sanctimoniously serve to close the doors

of the judiciary further.4 3
4. Disproportionate Impact
A persistent criticism of Rule 11 is that it has a disproportionate impact
on certain parties and attorneys. In particular, critics believe Rule 11 has a
greater impact on plaintiffs than defendants,' on civil rights plaintiffs than
other claimants,4 5 and on small firm attorneys than large firm attorneys.4 6

43. This comment was in response to the author's survey. The actual survey is contained in
Appendixes A and B (original on file with author).
44. Burbank, supra note 30, at 1947; Susan Lawshe, Survey Project,Attorney Sanctions: Rule
11, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 71, 76 (1989).
45. Arthur B. LaFrance, FederalRule 11 and PublicInterest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REV.
331, 353 (1988); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 503-06
(1988).
46. LaFrance, supra note 45, at 353; Lawshe, supra note 44, at 76.
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a. Impact on Plaintiffs
Data from case files and surveys address the impact of Rule 11 on plaintiffs and defendants. Case file data show that Rule 11 disproportionately
affected plaintiffs in both federal and state court. Chart 24 summarizes the
case file data. Plaintiffs were the targets of over seventy percent of the Rule
11 requests in both state and federal court. Further, the percentage of Rule
11 requests that were granted against plaintiffs was much higher than
against defendants. In federal court, twenty-two percent of the requests
against plaintiffs were granted but only six percent of the requests against
defendants were allowed. In state court, twelve percent of the requests
against plaintiffs were granted, but none against defendants were granted.
Finally, plaintiffs were the targets of all instances in which sanctions were
imposed in state court (4 of 4 instances) and the overwhelming majority in
federal court (17 of 19 instances (89%)) were against plaintiffs.
CHART 24
CASE FILE DATA-IMPACT ON PLAINTIFFS

Target of Rule 11 Request
Sanctions Imposed

Federal Court
Plaintiff Defendant
N(%)
N(%)
79 (72)
31 (28)
17 (22)
2 (6)

State Court
Plaintiff Defendant
N(%)
N(%)
34 (71)
14 (29)
4 (12)
0 (0)

The survey results provide additional information about the impacts of
Rule 11 on plaintiffs and defendants. To analyze these impacts, responses
of those attorneys who represent plaintiffs at least seventy-five percent of
the time (141 survey respondents) were compared with those who represent
defendants at least seventy-five percent of the time (81 survey respondents).
Chart 25 summarizes the comparison between the responses of plaintiffs'
attorneys and defendants' attorneys.
Just as the case file data show a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs in
formal Rule 11 activity, the survey data reveal that defendants' attorneys
were more likely than plaintiffs' attorneys to use Rule 11 informally by
warning an opponent that he or she was in violation or approaching violation of the Rule. Nevertheless, the impact of Rule 11 on the extent of prefiling law and fact inquiries was similar for plaintiffs and defendants' lawyers - about one-half of both groups reported increased pre-filing inquiry.
Generally, plaintiffs' attorneys are slightly more likely to feel both the positive and negative impacts of Rule 11 than defendants' attorneys.
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CHART 25
COMPARISON OF PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEYS

Plaintiff Defendant
Rule 11 Experience or Impact
Informal Use of Rule 11
Warned opponent in federal court case
Warned opponent in state court case

(%).

Rule 11 Benefits
Increased pre-filing fact inquiry
Increased pre-filing legal inquiry
Less likely to file papers for delay
Less likely to file papers for harassment
Rule 11 Costs
Aggravated relations between opposing attorneys
Aggravated relations between attorneys and judges
Aggravated relations between attorneys and clients
Less willing to make arguments to extend or change law
Did not accept meritorious case due to Rule 11
Federal Court
State Court
Did not assert meritorious claim or defense due to Rule 11
Federal Court
State Court

b. Impact on Civil Rights Claimants
The data lead to several conclusions about the impact of Rule 11 in civil
rights cases. First, this is a minor concern in state court. The state court
case file data show that in 1990 only one of the forty-eight Rule 11 requests
was targeted at a civil rights plaintiff. That request was denied. The survey
data also support this conclusion. Only eleven percent of the lawyers who
practice primarily in state court reported that Rule 11 decreased their willingness to assert civil rights claims. The other conclusions arise out of the
federal court data. Chart 26 summarizes case filings and Rule 11 activity in
civil rights cases in the Eastern District from 1984 to 1990.
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CHART 26
IMPACT IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES--FEDERAL COURT

(1984-1990)

Civil Cases filed 47
Rule 11 requests
Rule 11 requests against
represented plaintiffs
Sanctions imposed
Sanctions imposed against
represented plaintiffs

Prisoner
Civil Rights
Number Number (%)
6379
1193
(19)
110
15
(14)

Non-Prisoner
Civil Rights
Number (%)
341
(5)
22
(20)

56
19

10
3

(18)
(16)

8
4

(14)
(21)

9

2

(22)

1

(11)

Rule 11 did not disproportionately impact prisoners who filed civil
rights cases. Prisoner civil rights cases made up nineteen percent of the
civil cases filed in the Eastern District from 1984 to 1990. The percentage
of Rule 11 requests and sanctions against prisoner plaintiffs, regardless of
whether they are represented or proceeding pro se, was consistent with the
nineteen percent figure.
Non-prisoner civil rights plaintiffs have been the target of a disproportionately high degree of Rule 11 requests. Civil rights cases brought by
non-prisoners constituted five percent of the civil cases filed in the Eastern
District from 1984 to 1990. However, those plaintiffs were the target of
twenty percent of all Rule 11 requests. Represented civil rights plaintiffs
were the target of fourteen percent of the Rule 11 requests against all represented plaintiffs.
The sanction rate in non-prisoner civil rights cases and the sanction rate
against represented non-prisoner civil rights plaintiffs are consistent with
the rates in other cases. Sanctions were granted in four of the twenty-two
requests (18%) in non-prisoner civil rights cases and fifteen of the eightyeight requests (17%) in all other cases. Sanctions were granted in one of
the eight requests (12%) against represented non-prisoner civil rights plaintiffs and eight of the fifty-six requests (14%) against all other represented
plaintiffs.
The survey data offer evidence of the chilling effect of Rule 11 in civil
rights cases. One-fourth of the lawyers who practice primarily in federal
47. The figures for the number of civil cases, prisoner civil rights cases, and non-prisoner civil
rights cases filed in the Eastern District from 1984 through 1990 are derived from the sources
cited at supra note 14.
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court reported that Rule 11 decreased their willingness to assert civil rights
claims.
It appears from the data that the impact of Rule 11 on civil rights plaintiffs is much greater in federal court than in state court. One possible explanation is that few civil rights cases are filed in state court. However,
anecdotal evidence (the author's conversations with experienced civil rights
plaintiff's attorneys in Spokane) suggests that attorneys are at least as likely
to fie civil rights cases in state court as in federal court. A second possible
reason is that Rule 11 sanctions are requested and granted in a higher proportion of cases of any type in federal than state court. Of course, that
difference does not help explain why represented, non-prisoner civil rights
plaintiffs were the target of a disproportionately high percentage of Rule 11
requests in federal court.
c.

Impact on Solo Practitioners

The survey respondents can be categorized by the nature of their practice. Chart 27 presents the results for three categories of attorneys: government attorneys (34 respondents), solo practitioners (51 respondents), and
lawyers in firms with over twenty attorneys (63 respondents).
Two general observations can be made based on this data. First,
although Rule 11 did not have a disproportionate impact on solo practitioners as opposed to large firm lawyers, it deterred solo practitioners more
from taking cases. Second, Rule 11 affected government lawyers much less
than private attorneys.
Several of the comparisons in Chart 27 should be highlighted. Regarding experience with Rule 11, similar percentages of each category of lawyer
had formally requested Rule 11 sanctions. However, private attorneys were
more likely to use Rule 11 informally (to warn an opponent) than their
government counterparts. Less than one-third of the government lawyers
reported that they increased their pre-filing fact and law inquiry, while
nearly one-half of the solo practitioners and over half of the large firm lawyers said they increased their inquiries. Regarding Rule I l's negative impact on relations among attorneys, judges, and clients, substantial
percentages of private attorneys felt that these relationships had been aggravated by the Rule, while few of the government attorneys agreed. Finally, a
significant minority of large firm lawyers and solo practitioners reported
feeling the chill of Rule 11 on their creative advocacy and choice of cases,
claims, and defenses; very few government attorneys felt those chilling effects.
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CHART 27
IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, SOLO PRACTITIONERS, AND

LARGE FIRM ATTORNEYS

Government
Experience or Impact
~(%)~
Experience with Rule 11
Sought sanctions in federal court
Warned opponent in federal court case
Sought sanctions in state court
Warned opponents in state court case
Rule 11 Benefits
Increased pre-filing fact inquiry
Increased pre-filing legal inquiry
Less likely to file papers for delay
Less likely to file papers for harassment
Rule 11 Costs
Aggravated relations between opposing attorneys
28
Aggravated relations between attorneys and
9
judges
Aggravated relations between attorneys and
10
clients
Less willing to make arguments to extend or
4
change law
Did not accept meritorious case due to Rule 11
Federal Court
State Court
Did not assert meritorious claim or defense due
to Rule 11
Federal Court
State Court

5.

Solo

Large Firm

(/0
18
40
26
36
59
64
20
24
50

48

25

39

29

30

28

26

Overuse of Monetary, Fee-Shifting Sanctions

Many commentators have suggested that once a Rule 11 violation is
found, courts too often award monetary rather than nonmonetary sanctions.4 8 Further, many critics have argued that monetary sanctions should
not be used as a fee-shifting device but instead should be gauged by the
Rule's primary purpose of deterrence and should be paid to the court rather
48. Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 126

(1991); Vairo, supra note 4, at 231.
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than the opponent.49 Judges and lawyers simply disagree with the commentators who believe that the primary sanction for Rule 11 should be nonmonetary. An overwhelming ninety-three percent of the judges and
seventy-one percent of the lawyers who responded to the survey said that
the primary Rule 11 sanctions should be monetary. Judges' sanctioning
behavior reflected their preference for monetary sanctions. In state court,
all four sanctions were monetary. In federal court, the judges awarded sixteen monetary sanctions and five nonmonetary sanctions (dismissing the
suit three times and twice striking the offending paper). Three of the monetary sanctions were payable to the court and thirteen were payable to the
opposing party.
Judges and attorneys were asked to identify appropriate nonmonetary
sanctions. Eleven judges and 226 attorneys suggested from one to three
appropriate nonmonetary sanctions. Chart 28 lists the nonmonetary sanctions mentioned by more than ten attorneys or more than two judges.
CHART 28
NONMONETARY SANCTIONS SUGGESTED BY ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES

Sanction
Judgment against the violator
Strike the paper, claim, or defense
Public or private reprimand
Limit or suspend attorney's practice
Report violation to state bar
Prohibit proof on the issue
Limit issues, pleadings, discovery
Order violator to do pro bono work
Change or enforce time limits
Warning to violator

Attorneys
85
76
32
30
20
20
14
14
11
10

Judg
2
4
3
0
2
3
2
0
2
2

A wide variety of other nonmonetary sanctions were suggested, including "pillory," "decapitation," and "picking up garbage."
D.

Summary of Rule 11 Activity, Benefits, and Costs

1. Federal Court
From 1984 to 1990, 110 formal requests were made for Rule 11 sanctions and nineteen (17%) of those requests were granted. Almost all of the
49. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 36-41 (Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute and its purpose is
deterrence, not compensation); Vairo, supra note 4, at 231 (use of fines payable to the court will
reduce Rule 11 litigation because the prevailing party will not be lured by the chance of recovering

its fees).
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110 requests (96%) were raised by parties rather than judges; about half of
the requests were targeted at complaints. The number of Rule 11 requests
did not level off; instead it increased markedly in 1989 and 1990. Further,
the percentage of requests that were granted increased from thirteen percent in 1984 through 1989 to twenty-nine percent in 1990. For informal use
of Rule 11, most judges and half of the attorneys reported using Rule 11
warnings.
Most of the attorneys increased the extent of their pre-fling fact and law
inquiry as a result of Rule 11. Nevertheless, a majority of the lawyers who
practice primarily in federal court believed that the Rule had not led to the
benefits that the Rule's proponents hoped would flow from the increased
inquiry. In particular, very few attorneys reported that Rule 11 had a positive impact on litigation cost, the time for the resolution of suits, and the
likelihood of suit settlements. Substantial minorities of attorneys and a majority of federal judges believed that the Rule reduced abusive litigation
practices (filing papers for harassment or delay) and reduced the number of
frivolous suits, defenses, or motions.
None of the potential negative impacts of Rule 11 appeared to be an
overwhelming problem in the Eastern District. However, the question is
whether the cumulative weight of the costs of the Rule may constitute a
significant problem. The study looked at five potential costs or problems of
Rule 11. First, regarding satellite litigation, Rule 11 requests were not routine in the federal court. However, the burden Rule 11 imposed on each
judge in 1990 was not minuscule; the typical judge had to decide nine requests which generated fifteen briefs, seven affidavits, and five hearings.
Further, most of the Rule 11 requests were denied. Finally, nearly twothirds of the judges and attorneys believed attorneys used Rule 11 to harass
and intimidate opponents.
The second potential cost of the Rule is that it increased tension among
attorneys, judges, and clients. Most of the attorneys and half of the judges
believed Rule 11 aggravated relations between opposing attorneys. A little
less than half of the attorneys and judges reported that the Rule strained
attorney-judge relations. All of the judges and a majority of the lawyers
believed Rule 11 had no impact on relations between attorneys and clients.
Third, the chilling effects of Rule 11 were evident. Eleven percent of the
attorneys reported that the Rule decreased their creative advocacy and willingness to make arguments to extend or change law. About one-fourth of
the attorneys did not assert claims or defenses they believed were meritorious due to concerns over Rule 11. Further, one-fourth of the attorneys said
they were less likely to take civil rights cases as a result of the Rule.
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Fourth, Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on some litigants. Most
Rule 11 requests were targeted at plaintiffs and almost all requests that were
granted were against plaintiffs. Rule 11 sanctions were not requested or
imposed disproportionately against prisoner civil rights plaintiffs. On the
other hand, represented, non-prisoner civil rights plaintiffs were the target
of a disproportionately high number of Rule 11 requests. However, judges
imposed sanctions against represented non-prisoner civil rights plaintiffs at
about the same rate as against other represented plaintiffs.
Fifth, the vast majority of Rule 11 requests that were granted resulted in
monetary rather than non-monetary sanctions and most monetary sanctions were payable to the opposing party rather than the court.
2.

State Court

In 1990, forty-eight formal Rule 11 requests were made. All of the requests were raised by parties rather than judges and about half were
targeted at complaints. Only four of the requests (8%) were granted. Approximately one-half of the judges and parties reported using Rule 11
warnings.
Nearly half of the attorneys who practiced primarily in state court increased their pre-filing legal and fact inquiries due to Rule 11. About half
of the attorneys and over three-fourths of the judges believed Rule 11
caused a decrease in the number of frivolous suits, defenses, and motions,
which was the main goal of Rule 11 proponents. Few of the attorneys and
judges believed Rule 11 had a positive impact on litigation cost, the time for
resolution of suits, or the likelihood of suit settlement. Regarding abusive
litigation practices, over two-thirds of the judges believed Rule 11 had a
positive impact, but less than one-fourth of the attorneys agreed.
The five costs of Rule 11 analyzed in this study were not as prevalent in
state court as in federal court. First, satellite litigation is not a serious problem in state court. Rule 11 requests are not routine and the burden on each
judge is relatively small (five requests which generated six briefs, three affidavits, and three hearings, all of which were combined with hearings on
other motions). However, since only eight percent of the requests were
granted, most of the judges and attorneys' Rule 11 efforts were directed at
unsuccessful requests. Second, Rule 11 did not cause as much of an increase in tension between attorneys, judges, and clients in state court.
While about half of the judges and attorneys believed Rule 11 aggravated
relations between opposing attorneys, only one-fourth of the attorneys and
almost none of the judges believed Rule 11 aggravated attorney-judge or
attorney-client relationships. Third, Rule 1 l's chilling effect in state court
was similar to its effect in federal court. One-fifth of the attorneys reported
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that Rule 11 decreased their willingness to make arguments to extend or
change the law. Ten to fifteen percent of the attorneys said that Rule 11
caused them to refuse to take meritorious cases or assert meritorious claims
or defenses. Fourth, Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were the targets of over seventy percent of the Rule 11 requests
and all of the requests that were granted. However, only one of the Rule 11
requests targeted a civil rights plaintiff. Fifth, all of the four sanctions
awarded in state court were monetary and payable to the opposing party.
3.

Attorneys and Judges' Evaluations of Rule 11

Attorneys and judges were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with
this statement: "The advantages of Rule 11 outweigh its disadvantages."
Chart 29 presents the results.
CHART 29
RULE 11 ADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH DISADVANTAGES

Respondent
Judges - federal
Judges - state
Attorneys - federal
Attorneys - state
Plaintiffs' attorneys
Defendants' attorneys
Government attorneys
Solo practitioners
Large firm attorneys

Agree
(%)
83
78
71
60
56
64
77
39
69

No Opinion
(%)
17
22
5

19
19
13
13
31
5

Disagree
(%)
0
0
24
21
25
23
10
31
26

The vast majority of judges believed the advantages of Rule 11 outweigh
its disadvantages. The attorneys were less certain. About a quarter of most
groups of attorneys disagreed with the statement. Certain groups of attorneys were more favorably disposed toward the Rule (government attorneys,
defendants' attorneys, and attorneys who practiced primarily in federal
court) than other groups (solo practitioners, plaintiffs' attorneys, and state
court attorneys). However, no matter how the attorneys are categorized,
more members of each group agree with the statement than disagree.
A number of attorneys commented that the Rule 11 cost/benefit analysis would be more favorable if judges were more likely to impose Rule 11
sanctions. One stated, for example, that "until CR-11 sanctions are regularly imposed, the rule can be expected to have little effect on the practice of
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law. I strongly encourage vigorous enforcement of the rule."5 Another
believed that "the advantages of the rule would greatly outweigh its disadvantages if it were actually applied by the courts.""1
The data do not appear to support the thesis that more vigorous enforcement of Rule 11 will increase the benefits realized from the Rule. The
incidence data from case files and the attorneys' comments on the surveys
show that Rule 11 sanctions were imposed much more often in federal than
state court. The survey results also reveal that more federal court lawyers
increased their pre-filing fact and law inquiry than state court lawyers.
However, the benefits that the Rule's proponents hoped would flow from
the increased pre-filing inquiry occurred about equally in state and federal
court. In fact, the greatest single positive impact of the Rule was the decrease in frivolous suits, defenses, and motions reported by state judges and
attorneys. On the other hand, the data support the inference that judicial
hesitancy to impose sanctions reduces some of the negative impacts of Rule
11. Satellite litigation, disproportionate impacts on civil rights plaintiffs,
and the aggravation of relations between attorneys, judges, and clients are
more serious problems in federal than state court.
III.

COMPARISON TO OTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES

The Eastern District case file and survey data from this study can be
compared to empirical studies of Rule 11 in other federal courts. Comparisons will be made to the relevant data from four other studies. The Third
Circuit Task Force study included case file data for all formal Rule 11 activity decided by the district courts in the Third Circuit between July 1,
1987, and June 30, 1988, and surveys of attorneys who practiced in the
Third Circuit. 2 The Nelken study consisted of surveys ofjudges and attorneys in the Northern District of California. 3 The Federal Judicial Center
(FJC) study included surveys of all federal district court judges and case file
data for formal Rule 11 activity in cases filed from January 1, 1987, through
mid-1990 for four district courts (District of Arizona, District of District of
Columbia, Northern District of Georgia, and Western District of Texas)
and cases ified from mid-1988 to mid-1990 for the Eastern District of Mich-

50. This comment was in response to the author's survey. The actual survey is contained in
Appendixes A and B (original on file with author).
51. Id.

52. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 5-6.
53. Nelken, supra note 4, at 147.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:313

igan.54 The American Judicature Society (AJS) study consisted of surveys
of lawyers in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.55
A.

Amount, Nature, and Disposition of Formal Rule 11 Activity-Comparison With Other Studies

The amount, nature, and disposition of formal Rule 11 activity in the
Eastern District are quite similar to the Rule 11 activity reported by other
empirical studies of federal courts. The amount of formal Rule 11 activity
in the Eastern District is roughly comparable to the Rule 11 activity in
other parts of the country. The Third Circuit Task Force reported that
approximately one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the civil cases pending in
the Third Circuit from July 1, 1987, through June 30, 1988, involved Rule
11 motions during that time.5 6 Approximately one percent (1.0%) of the
civil cases pending in the Eastern District during the same time period involved Rule 11 motions.57 The FJC study compared the number of cases
involving Rule 11 motions and sua sponte consideration of Rule 11 to the
number of civil cases filed from the beginning of 1987 to mid-1990 for four
districts.58 The percentages of filed cases involving formal Rule 11 activity
were: Northern District of Georgia (1.4%); District of Columbia (1.5%);
District of Arizona (1.7%); and Western District of Texas (2.5%).59 In the
Eastern District, (1.3%) 89 of 6735 of the civil cases filed from August
1983, through December 31, 1990, involved formal Rule 11 activity. In
summary, the percentage of cases involving formal Rule 11 activity was
twice as high in the Eastern District than in the Third Circuit. However,
the Eastern District was on the low end of the spectrum compared to the
districts in the FJC study.
The nature of the formal Rule 11 activity in the Eastern District is consistent with the formal activity in other courts in two respects. First, the
vast majority of formal Rule 11 activity is raised by parties rather than by
judges. In the Eastern District, judges raised only four percent of the formal Rule 11 requests. The percentages of the formal Rule 11 activity raised
54. WIGGINS &
55.

WILLGING,

supra note 4, § IA, at 1, § IB, at 1-2.

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 1-2.

56. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 60.

57. The one percent figure is based on the following. The number of civil cases pending in the
Eastern District was 1,346 on the last day of 1986; 1,089 on the last day of 1987; and 1,069 on the
last day of 1988. JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS (1987), supra note 14, at 27; JUDICIAL
WORKLOAD STATISTICS (1988), supra note 14, at 29. Therefore, an average of 1,168 cases were
pending at any time during the period. In 1987 and 1988, 11 Rule 11 motions were made in the

Eastern District in each year.
58. WIGGINS & WILLGING, supra note 4, § IB, at 2.

59. Id. The percentages in the text were calculated from figures in Table 1.

1992]

RULE 11 PRACTICE

by judges as reported in the FJC study were: District of Arizona (7%);
District of District of Columbia (3%); Northern District of Georgia (6%);
Eastern District of Michigan (2%); and Western District of Texas (7%). o
Second, the most common paper target of formal Rule 11 activity was complaints. Complaints were the target of the following percentages of formal
sanction requests: Eastern District (49%); Third Circuit (50%);61 District
of Arizona (40%); District of District of Columbia (39%); Northern District of Georgia (37%); Eastern District of Michigan (54%); and Western
District of Texas (34%).62
The disposition of formal Rule 11 requests is remarkably similar in all
federal courts in which data has been gathered. The percentage of formal
Rule 11 requests that are granted is nearly identical in federal courts across
the country: Eastern District (17%); district courts in the Third Circuit
64
(19%);63 district courts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits (17%);
and the Districts of Arizona, the District of Columbia, Northern Georgia,
Eastern Michigan, and Western Texas (18%).65
B.

Rule 11 Benefits-Comparison With Other Studies

The beneficial effects of Rule 11, or lack thereof, in the Eastern District
were measured in part through surveys of lawyers who regularly practice
civil litigation in the Eastern District. Those survey results were compared
to the Nelken study's surveys of lawyers in the Northern District of California and the Third Circuit Task Force's surveys of attorneys in the Third
Circuit. Chart 30 summarizes the results.
The comparison between the effects of Rule 11 in the Eastern District of
Washington and the effects in the Northern District of California reveal
conflicting results. When assessing the Rule's impact on their own practices, the Washington lawyers consistently reported greater effects than did
the California lawyers. However, when assessing the Rule's impact on opposing counsel, the California attorneys observed greater effects in every
category than the Washington lawyers. The California and Washington
lawyers are consistent in one respect-they felt the impact of Rule 11 much
more than lawyers in the Third Circuit.
60. Id § IB, at 5, Table 5.

61.

BURBANK,

supra note 4, at 66.

62. WIGGINS & WILLGING, supra note 4, § IB, at 13.
63. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 110-12 (26 of 140 requests).
64. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 8.
65. WIGGINS & WILLGING, supra note 4, § IB, at 7, 9, Tables 9, 12. The 18% figure is based
on 205 requests granted (total from Table 12) and 1,111 requests resolved with or without a ruling
(total requests not pending from Table 9).
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CHART 30
RULE 11 BENEFITS
66
RESULTS FROM THREE EMPIRICAL STUDIES

E.D. Wash. N.D. Cal. 3d. Cir.
Effect on Attorney's Own Practice
Increased pre-filing fact inquiry
Increased pre-filing legal inquiry
Filing papers for delay
Filing papers for harassment
Effect on Opposing Attorney's Practice
Increased pre-filing fact inquiry
Increased pre-filing legal inquiry
Filing papers for delay
Filing papers for harassment

(%)

(%)

(%)

71
62
35
27

46
33
14
14

44
35
3
4

40
31
27
37

59
36
82
82

24
18
13
17

The types of effects that the Rule drafters hoped would flow from Rule
11 were reported by a much higher percentage of Eastern District lawyers
than their Third Circuit counterparts. Two factors may produce this difference. First, the Eastern District survey was conducted in 1990; the Third
Circuit study was conducted in 1987 through 1988. Thus, the Eastern District lawyers had more years of experience with Rule 11 when they were
surveyed. Second, Rule 11 activity was more common in the Eastern District than the Third Circuit. In 1987 and 1988, cases in the Eastern District
were twice as likely to contain Rule 11 requests than cases in the Third
Circuit.6 7 Further, Rule 11 requests in the Eastern District increased dramatically in 1989 and 1990.68
Finally, the effect of Rule 11 on the settlement of civil litigation was
addressed in the AJS study. The AJS study reported that 12% of the lawyers believed Rule 11 facilitated the settlement of a case while 11.6% believed the Rule interfered with settlements.6 9 Nearly identical results were
found in the Eastern District: 11% of the attorneys believed Rule 11 increased the likelihood of settlement and 11% believed it decreased the likelihood of settlement.

66. The figures for the Northern District of California and Third Circuit are taken from
Tables 1 and 2 of the Nelken Study. Nelken, supra note 4, at 152.
67. See supra Chart 1.

68.
69.

AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
BURBANK, supra note 4, at 85-96.

supra note 4, at 17.
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C. Rule 11 Costs-Comparison With Other Studies
Several of the costs of Rule 11 in the Eastern District were compared to
costs in other federal courts. Comparisons will be made to relevant data
from three empirical studies: the Nelken study, the Third Circuit Task
Force report, and the FJC study of five federal district courts.
Three studies asked lawyers whether Rule 11 aggravates relationships
between opposing attorneys, between attorneys and judges, and between attorneys and clients. Chart 31 lists the results.
CHART 31
WHETHER RULE 11 AGGRAVATES RELATIONSHIPS

ATTORNEY SURVEYS

E.D. Wash. 3d. Cir. N.D. Cal.
Relationship

Between opposing attorneys
Between attorneys and judges
Between attorneys and clients

(%)

(%)70

(%)71

63
40
35

40
16
12

49
29
(NA)

The studies are consistent in one respect: Rule 11 aggravated relations
between attorneys to a greater extent than attorney-judge or attorney-client
relationships. However, a higher percentage of Eastern District attorneys
reported these negative effects than attorneys in the Third Circuit or
California.
The three studies also asked lawyers about the chilling effect of Rule 11
on legitimate advocacy. The responses of Eastern District lawyers are quite
similar to those of the lawyers in California and the Third Circuit. Chart
32 shows the results.
CHART 32
WHETHER RULE 11 CHILLS ADVOCACY
ATTORNEY SURVEYS

E.D. Wash. 3d. Cir. N.D. Cal.
(%)73
(%)72
(%)
Chilling Effect
13
5
11
Seeking to extend or change law
14
(NA)
15
Did not accept meritorious case
15
23
(NA)
Did not assert meritorious claim or defense

70.
71.
72.
73.

Nelken, supra note 4, at
BURBANK, supra note 4,
Nelken, supra note 4, at
BURBANK, supra note 4,

150.
at 84.
150.
at 57.
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The case file data from the Eastern District and two other studies show
that Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are
much more likely than defendants to be the targets of Rule 11 requests.
Further, a greater percentage of requests is granted against plaintiffs than
against defendants. Chart 33 summarizes the results.
CHART 33
RULE 11 IMPACTS ON PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS
CASE FILE DATA

E.D. Wash.

Impact

W%

Target of Rule 11 request
Plaintiff
Defendant

72
28

Percent of requests against that party that are granted
Plaintiff
22
Defendant
6

3d. Cir.
(%~_

(%)75

67
33

59
37

16
9

(NA)
(NA)

FJC

The case file data from the Eastern District and two other studies show
that Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact in civil rights cases. However,
the nature of the disproportionate impact varies from study to study. The
Third Circuit Task Force reported that the percentage of civil rights cases
involving Rule 11 requests (18% of requests) was proportionate to the percentage of civil rights cases on the docket (16% of cases filed were civil
rights cases). However, represented civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned at
a much higher rate (45%) than other represented plaintiffs (9%).76 The
FJC study found that a disproportionately high percentage of civil rights
cases involved Rule 11 requests but that represented civil rights plaintiffs
were sanctioned at a rate similar to all other types of litigants. 77 The Eastern District data is consistent with that of the FJC. A disproportionately
high percentage of Rule 11 requests were made in civil rights cases (34%)
compared to the portion of civil rights cases on the docket (24%). However, represented civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned at a similar rate
(12% of requests) as other represented plaintiffs (16%).
74. WIGGINS & WILLGING, supra note 4, § IB, at 14, Table 9. The figures in Chart 33 are
based on totals derived from Table 9.
75. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 69-71.

76. Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., The FederalJudicialCenter'sStudy ofRule 11, 2 FJC DIRECTIONS 1, 21 (1991).
77. BURBANK, supra note 4, at 112-14.
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Finally, the types of sanctions imposed in the Eastern District are consistent with the sanctions reported by the Third Circuit Task Force and the
FJC. By far the most common sanction is a monetary one, payable to the
opposing party. The results are in Chart 34.
CHART 34
TYPES OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS
CASE FILE DATA

E.D. Wash.

Sanction

(%)

Monetary-pay to opposing party
Monetary-pay to court
Non-monetary

62
14
24

3d. Cir.
(%)78

67
11
22

FJC
79

_

71
8
21

78. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7. The proposal would amend Rule 11 to provide:
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS
TO COURT; SANCTIONS

(a) SIGNATURE. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's
address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper
shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to
the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances(1) it is not being presented or maintained for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
(C) SANCTIONS. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How INITIATED
(A) BY MOTION. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately
from other motions or requests, and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to
violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed
with, or presented to, the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE DATA

This study sought to comprehensively assess the costs and benefits of
Rule 11 in state and federal courts in one geographic location - Spokane
County, Washington. However, as Part III demonstrates, the effect of Rule
11 in federal court in the Eastern District of Washington is similar to the
Rule's impact in other federal district courts. Unfortunately, no other empirical research has been done in state courts so it is impossible to tell
whether the impact of Rule 11 in Spokane County Superior Courts is typical of other state courts. Nevertheless, this study provides information relevant to the ongoing Rule 11 debate.
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or argument is not withdrawn or
corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the
reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) ON COURT'S INITIATIVE. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with
respect thereto.
(2) NATURE OF SANCTION; LIMITATIONS. A sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and
(3), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order
to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective
deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the
court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) ORDER. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this role and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed.
(d) INAPPLICABILITY TO DISCOVERY. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not
apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are
subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
79. WIGGINS & WILLGING, supra note 4, § IB, at 8. The figures in Chart 34 are based on
totals derived from Table 13.
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The Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

In August 1991, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules published
proposed amendments to Federal Rule 11." The Advisory Committee
listed the criticisms of Rule 11 that it believed had merit.
(1) Rule 11, in conjunction with other rules, has tended to impact plaintiffs more frequently and severely than defendants; (2) it
occasionally has created problems for a party which seeks to assert
novel legal contentions or which needs discovery from other persons
to determine if the party's belief about the facts can be supported
with evidence; (3) it has too rarely been enforced through nonronetary sanctions, with cost-shifting having become the normative sanction; (4) it provides little incentive, and perhaps a disincentive, for a
party to abandon positions after determining they are no longer
supportable in fact or law; and (5) it sometimes has produced unfortunate conflicts between attorney and client, and exacerbated contentious behavior between counsel. In addition, although the great
majority of Rule 11 motions have not been granted, the time spent
by litigants and the courts in dealing with such motions has not been
insignificant."1
All of the criticisms are supported by the federal court data in this study,
except the fourth because that issue was not studied.
After receiving comments on the 1991 proposed amendment, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure published a revised proposed amendment to Rule 11 in 1992.82 The Committee Note identifies the
purpose of the proposed amendments: "The revision is intended to remedy
problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983
revision of the Rule .... The revision ... should reduce the number of
motions for sanctions presented to the court."8 3
These are laudable goals. The results of this study suggest that they are
attainable goals. A much higher percentage of federal court cases contained
Rule 11 requests than state court cases. 84 Further, the negative impacts of
the Rule were generally higher in federal court.8" However, state court ex-

80. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 1-9 (1991).
81. Id at 4.
82. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7.
83. Id. at 49-50.
84. See supra section II.B.
85. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7, at 2, 5-6.
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perienced the greatest single positive impact of Rule 11-the reduction of
frivolous suits, defenses, and motions.8 6
The difficult question is whether these revisions to Rule 11 will reduce
the number of Rule 11 motions and address the problems the Rule caused.
Three of the proposed revisions hold the keys to answering this question:
(1) the scope of the attorney's certification; (2) the motion procedure; and
(3) the choice of sanction.
1. Scope of the Attorney's Certification
In one respect, the proposal narrows the scope of the attorney's certification under Rule 11. The amendment allows the attorney to make factual
allegations that "are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,"87 whereas the existing
Rule requires the attorney to certify that the paper has a factual basis.8 8
The Advisory Committee states that this change will "equalize the burden
of the Rule upon plaintiffs and defendants" by allowing both parties to rely
on information and belief in their pleadings.8 9 This revision should reduce
the disproportionate impact that Rule 11 has on plaintiffs, an effect found in
this and other empirical studies of the Rule.9 0 This proposed change should
also reduce the number of Rule 11 motions.
But other revisions significantly expand the certification standard. As
the Rule is currently interpreted by most courts, the certification applies to
the paper as a whole.9 1 The 1991 proposal extends the certification to the
presentation of "claims, .... defenses," "other legal contentions,..... allegations," "denials," and "other factual contentions." 92 This proposal significantly expands the potential targets of a Rule 11 motion. It would be quite
surprising if this revision results in fewer Rule 11 motions. In fact, it could
greatly increase them. Consequently, the expanded certification standard
may increase satellite litigation, the chilling effects on creative advocacy,
and the tension among attorneys, judges, and clients. The Advisory Committee may be more likely to achieve its goals of reducing the number of
Rule 11 motions and reducing the negative effects of the Rule if it kept the
86. See supra section II.C.
87. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7, at 45-46.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 1.
89. See supra section III.B.

90.

GREGORY

P.

JOSEPH, SANCTIONS:

THE FEDERAL

§§ 6.C.4., 14.D.2. (1989).
91. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7, at 45-46.

92. Id.

LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
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certification standard applicable only to the paper as a whole at the time it
was filed.
2.

Motion Procedure

The proposed revision sets forth the procedure to be followed when a
party requests Rule 11 sanctions. The party must make the Rule 11 motion
separately from other motions, must serve it on the alleged offender, and
cannot file it with the court if within twenty-one days of service the offending matter is corrected or withdrawn. 93 The Advisory Committee hopes
this provision will encourage offenders to withdraw matters that constitute
violations of the Rule.9 4 If these hopes are realized, the satellite litigation
burden on judges described in this study" should be reduced because they
would not have to decide as many Rule 11 motions.
3.

Choice of Sanction

The proposed revision makes several changes in the Rule's language
dealing with appropriate sanctions. First, the proposed revision gives the
court discretion whether to award sanctions after finding a Rule 11 violation. The revision provides that if a court determines that the certification
standard has not been met, it "may impose.., an appropriate sanction," 96
whereas the current version of the Rule provides that "the court ... shall
impose... an appropriate sanction" in the same circumstance.9 7 Second,
the revision makes clear that the sanction is "limited to what is sufficient to
deter comparable conduct by persons similarly situated."9 Third, the proposal mentions three types of sanctions: a nonmonetary penalty, a monetary
penalty payable to the court, or an order to pay to the movant some or all of
the reasonable costs and attorneys fees directly caused by the violation. 99
These changes could have salutary effects on judges' choice of sanctions.
They may reduce the heavy reliance on monetary sanctions payable to the
opposing party, which was found in this and other empirical studies of Rule
11. 1° Further, if judges exercise their discretion not to award sanctions, to
award more nonmonetary sanctions, and to limit monetary sanctions to the
expenses directly caused by the Rule 11 violation, the rule may lose its al93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 8.
95. See supra section II.C.1.
96. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7, at 46.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, supra note 1.
98. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 7, at 4.
99. Id.
100. See supra section III.B.
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lure as a fee-shifting device and the number of Rule 11 motions may
decline.
B.

State Action on Rule 11

This study has implications for policymakers involved with Rule 11 in
state court. The most important generalization from the data is that the
impact of Rule 11 may be very different in federal and state court. The
level of Rule 11 activity, the benefits of the Rule, and its costs may vary in
state and federal court. As a result, studies of the impact of Rule 11 in
federal court may have limited value to policymakers dealing with Rule 11
at the state level. For example, this and other empirical studies found that
Rule 11 has a disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs and a chilling effect on civil rights lawyers in federal court. 10 1 However, Rule 11 had
very little impact on civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers in state court.1 0 2
Consequently, revisions in Rule 11 designed to address problems with the
Rule in federal court may be inappropriate for states, where the negative
effects of Rule 11 may be altogether different.
Those states that have never adopted the 1983 amendments to Rule 11
may have two sets of issues to address. Are there abuses that significantly
burden the civil litigation process, such as abusive litigation practices or
frivolous claims, defenses, or motions, that delay or raise the cost of suit
resolution? If so, is any version of Rule 11 likely to eliminate those civil
litigation problems without creating more significant problems of its own?
For states that adopted the 1983 version of Rule 11, the issues are
slightly different. First, what are the benefits and costs of Rule 11 in the
state court? Second, will the benefit/cost ratio be improved by returning to
the pre-1983 version, by adopting the Standing Committee's proposed revision, or by following some other means?
Regardless of the current status of a state's Rule 11, each state should
decide the future of the Rule for its courts. To make an informed decision,
a state should assess the significance of its abusive and frivolous litigation
problems and the costs and benefits of Rule 11 as a solution to those
problems. That process will not be easy. However, the stakes are great
enough in the Rule 11 debate to make the effort worthwhile.

101. Id.
102. See supra section II.C.4.
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APPENDIX A

RULE 11 PROJECT
JUDGE/MAGISTRATE SURVEY
Gonzaga University School of Law

P.O. Box 3528
Spokane, WA 99220-3528
1.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

II.

1. In which court do you preside? (Circle Answer)
a. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
b. Spokane County Superior Court
2. In what capacity do you currently serve? (Circle Answer)
a. Judge
b. Magistrate
EXPERIENCE WITH F.R.C.P. 11 OR C.R. 11
Questions 3-6 concern your experiences with F.R.C.P. 11 or C.R. 11 (hereinafter
"Rule 11") during the last four years.
3.

Have you decided Rule 11 motions raised by the attorneys or parties? (Circle
answer)

a. No
b. Yes -

Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times did you impose
sanctions?

4. Have you on your own motion raised the issue of imposing Rule 11 sanctions?
(Circle answer)
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times did you impose
sanctions?

5.

In instances other than those included in Questions 3 and 4, have you warned
attorneys or parties that they were in violation or were approaching violation
of Rule 11? (Circle answer)
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
In your opinion, how many of the warnings were
effective?

6.

III.

For the cases in which you awarded Rule 11 sanctions, approximately how
many times was the sanction:
a. Monetary only
b. Non-monetary only
c. Both monetary and non-monetary
OPINIONS ABOUT RULE 11
The remainderof this survey deals with your opinions about Rule 11.
7. The primary purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to: (Circle one)

360
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a. Punish attorneys of parties who violate the rule
Deter other attorneys and parties from violating the rule

b.

c.

Compensate parties harmed by violations of the rule

d.

Other (Please specify):

8. If a court finds a Rule 11 violation, the primary sanction should be: (Circle
one)
a.
9.

Monetary sanctions

b. Non-monetary sanctions
If a court decides to impose a monetary sanction, the primary factor the court
should use to determine the amount of the sanction should be: (Circle one)
a. Expense caused by the violation
b.

Violators ability to pay

c. Willfulness of the violation
d.

Pro se violator

e.

Repeat violator

f. Other (Please specify):

10.

If a court decided to impose a non-monetary sanction, what types of sanctions
should it consider:
a.
b.

11.

C.
In your opinion, what effect has Rule 11 had on attorneys practicing before
you in the following areas: (Please circle a number for each item.)
Greatly
Decreased

Somewhat
Decreased

No
Effect

Somewhat
Increased

Greatly
Increased

A. Extent of pre-filing
factual inquiry

1

2

3

4

5

B. Extent of pre-filing legal
inquiry
C. Willingness to make
arguments to extend or
change law
D. Willingness to assert
unconventional claims
or defenses

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

E. Willingness to assert
civil rights claims

1

2

3

4

5
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F. Likelihood of filing
1
2
3
4
5
papers for delay
G. Likelihood of filing
1
2
3
4
5
papers for harassment
12. In your opinion, what effect, if any, has Rule 11 had on the practice of law in
the following areas? (Please circle a number for each item).
Greatly
Somewhat
No
Somewhat
Greatly
Decreased
Decreased
Effect
Increased Increased
A. Number of Frivolous
1
2
3
4
5
suits, defenses or
motions
B. Cost of litigation
1
2
3
4
5
C. Amount of time for
1
2
3
4
5
resolution of suit
D. Likelihood of settlement
1
2
3
4
5
of suit
Greatly
Somewhat
No
Somewhat
Greatly
Aggravated Aggravated Effect Improved Improved
E. Relations between attys
1
2
3
4
5
for opposing parties
F. Relations between attys
1
2
3
4
5
and judges/magistrates
G. Relations between attys
1
2
3
4
5
and clients
Strongly
Somewhat
No
Somewhat Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Opinion
Agree
Agree
H. Attys use Rule I Ias a
1
2
3
4
5
tactic to harass and
intimidate opponents
I. The advantages of Rule
1
2
3
4
5
11 outweigh its
disadvantages
13. Please make any comments you wish regarding Rule 11.
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APPENDIX B
RULE 11 PROJECT
ATTORNEY SURVEY

Gonzaga University School of Law
P.O. Box 3528
Spokane, WA 99220-3528
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. How many years have you been admitted to the bar in
any state?
2.

years

Currently, do you practice in (circle one):
a. Law firm
If so, how many lawyers are in your firm?
b. Corporate or private organization
c. Government
d. Other (please specify)

The remainderof the survey asks about your personal opinions,practice, and
experience with Rule 11, not the practiceand experience of yourfirm.
3. Since August, 1983, approximately what percentage of your practice was
devoted to civil litigation?
If 0%, please stop here and return survey.
%
4.

Since August, 1983, approximately what percentage of your civil litigation
practice was in the:
a.

Federal Courts

__

.%

b.

Washington Superior Courts

__

.%

5. Since August, 1983, approximately what percentage of your civil litigation
clients were:

II.

a.

Private Plaintiffs

__

.%

b.

Private Defendants

__

.%

c.
d.
e.

Governmental plaintiffs
Governmental defendants
Other (please specify

%
%

EXPERIENCES WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Questions 6-15 deal with your experience with FR.C.P. 11 since August 1, 1983 in
civil litigation in federal court.
A. Questions 6-9 concern cases in federal court in which you or your opponent
asked the court to impose F.R.C.P. 11 sanctions or in which the court raised
F.R.C.P. 11 on its own motion.
6.

Have you sought sanctions under F.R.C.P. 11? (Circle one)
a. No

RULE 11 PRACTICE
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Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
Has an opposing attorney or party sought sanctions against you or your
client under F.R.C.P. 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
b. Yes

7.

8.

9.

B.

-

Has a court on its own motion raised the issue of F.R.C.P. 11 sanctions
against your or your client?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
Has a court on its own motion raised the issue of F.R.C.P. 11 sanctions
against an opposing attorney or party?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?

Questions 10-13 concern those cases in federal court in which you, your
opponent or the court warned a party or attorney about FR.C.P. 11 without
formally seeking sanctions.
10. Have you warned an opposing attorney or party that they were in
violation or were approaching a violation of F.R.C.P. 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
11.

Has an opposing attorney or party warned you that you were in violation
or were approaching a violation of F.R.C.P. 11 ?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

12.

Has a court warned you that you were in violation or were approaching
violation of F.R.C.P. 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

13.

Has a court warned an opposing attorney or party that they were in
violation or were approaching a violation of F.R.C.P. 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

C. Questions 14 and 15 deal with the direct impact of F.R.C.P. 11 on your
willingness to take cases and assert claims or defenses in federal court.
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14.

III.

Have there been any cases that could have been brought in federal court
and that you considered meritorious but which you did not accept
because of concern of possible F.R.C.P. 11 sanctions?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
15. Have there been any claims or defenses that you considered meritorious
but which you did not assert in federal court due to concern about
possible F.R.C.P. sanctions?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
EXPERIENCES WITH WASHINGTON SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULE 11
Questions 16-19 deal with your experiences with CR 11 since September 1, 1985, in
civil litigation in Washington Superior Courts.
A.

Questions 16-25 concern cases in Washington Superior Courts in which you or
your opponent asked the court to impose CR 11 sanctions or in which the court
raised CR 11 on its own motion.
16. Have you sought sanctions under CR 11? (Circle one)
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
17. Has an opposing attorney or party sought sanctions against you or your
client under CR 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
18. Has a court on its own motion raised the issue of CR 11 sanctions
against your or your client?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
19. Has a court on its own motion raised the issue of CR 11 sanctions
against an opposing attorney or party?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
Approximately how many times were
sanctions imposed?
B. Questions 20-23 concern those cases in Washington Superior Court in which you,
your opponent or the court warned a party or attorney about CR 11 without
formally seeking sanctions.
20. Have you warned an opposing attorney or party that they were in
violation or were approaching a violation of CR 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?
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21.

Has an opposing attorney or party warned you that you were inviolation
or were approaching a violation of CR 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

22.

Has a court warned you that you were in violation or were approaching
violation of CR 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

23.

Has a court warned an opposing attorney or party that they were in
violation or were approaching a violation of CR 11?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

C. Questions 24 and 25 deal with the direct impact of CR 11 on your willingness to
take cases and assert claims or defenses in Washington Superior Courts

IV.

24.

Have there been any cases that could have been brought in Washington
Superior Court and that you considered meritorious but which you did
not accept because of concern of possible CR 11 sanctions?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

25.

Have there been any claims or defenses that you considered meritorious
but which you did not assert in Washington Superior Court due to
concern about possible CR 11 sanctions?
a. No
b. Yes - Approximately how many times?

OPINIONS ABOUT RULE 11
The remainder of this survey deals with your opinions about FR. CP.11 and CR 11,
which together will be referred to as "Rule 1L "
26.

The primary purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to: (Circle one)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Punish attorneys of parties who violate the rule
Deter other attorneys and parties from violating the rule
Compensate parties harmed by violations of the rule
Other (Please specify):

27.

If a court finds a Rule 11 violation, the primary sanction should be:
(Circle one)
a. Monetary sanctions
b. Non-monetary sanctions

28.

If a court decides to impose a monetary sanction, the primary factor the
court should use to determine the amount of the sanction should be:
(Circle one)
a. Expense caused by the violation
b. Violators ability to pay
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Willfulness of the violation

d. Pro se violator
e. Repeat violator
f. Other (Please specify):

29.

30.

If a court decided to impose a non-monetary sanction, what types of
sanctions should it consider:
a.
b.
C.
Has Rule 11 affected your practice in the following areas? (Please circle a
number for each item).
Greatly
Decreased

Somewhat
Decreased

No
Effect

Somewhat
Increased

1

2

3

4

B. Extent of pre-filing legal
inquiry

2

3

4

C. Willingness to make
arguments to extend or
change law

2

3

4

A. Extent of pre-filing factual
inquiry

Greatly
Increased

D. Willingness to assert
2
3
4
unconventional claims or
defenses
E. Willingness to assert civil
2
3
4
rights claims
F. Likelihood of filing papers
2
3
4
for delay
G. Likelihood of filing papers
4
2
3
for harassment
31. In your opinion, has Rule 11 affected your opponent's practices in the
following areas? (Please circle a number for each item).
Greatly
Decreased

Somewhat
Decreased

No
Effect

Somewhat
Increased

A. Extent of pre-filing factual
inquiry

2

3

4

B. Extent of pre-filing legal
inquiry

2

3

4

C. Willingness to make
arguments to extend or
change law

2

3

4

D. Willingness to assert
unconventional claims or
defenses

2

3

4

Greatly
Increased
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E. Willingness to assert civil
rights claims

2

3

4

F. Likelihood of filing papers
for delay

2

3

4

G. Likelihood of filing papers
for harassment

2

3

4

32.

In your opinion, what effect, if any, has Rule 11 had on the practice of law in
the following areas? (Please circle a number for each item).
Greatly
Greatly
Somewhat
No
Somewhat
Increased
Decreased
Decreased Effect Increased
1
4
2
3
A. Number of Frivolous
suits, defenses or motions
1
4
2
3
B. Cost of litigation
1
2
3
4
5
C. Amount of time for
resolution of suit
1
4
5
3
2
D. Likelihood of settlement
of suit
Greatly
Greatly
Somewhat
No
Somewhat
Aggravated Aggravated Effect Improved Improved
1
3
4
5
2
E. Relations between attys
for opposing parties
F. Relations between attys
and judges/magistrates

1

2

3

4

5

G. Relations between attys
and clients

1

2

3

4

5

H. Attys use Rule 11 as a tactic
to harass and intimidate
opponents

Strongly
Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

No
Opinion

Somewhat
Agree

Strongly
Agree

1

2

3

4

5

4

5

2
3
I. The advantages of Rule 11
outweigh its disadvantages
33. Please make any comments you wish regarding Rule 11.

